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I. INTRODUCTION
Only with great trepidation do I undertake to comment upon
Professor Karlan's fine Article.1 Much of what I know about voting
rights law I have learned from her work, and her contribution to this
Symposium is characteristically erudite, detailed, and cogent. I will
therefore limit myself to offering four modest observations about her
argument. My central point is simple: While Professor Karlan successfully identifies several empirical questions that critics of majorityblack voting districts must answer, those same questions also raise
problems for defenders of majority-black districts (including Professor
Karlan herself).
Professor Karlan's argument is directed against what I shall
call "the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis": the idea that districting
plans that increase the number of black legislators may nevertheless
*
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am grateful to the other
participants in the Vanderbilt Law School's Symposium on Defining Democracy for the Next
Century, and especially Pam Karlan, for their helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at the New York University
School of Law, which provided generous financial support for this research.
1. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50
Vand. L. Rev. 291 (1997).

347

348

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:347

produce legislative assemblies less receptive to black interests. 2 The
Hypothesis maintains that by packing minority voters into a few
districts, racial gerrymanders increase the likelihood that the state's
remaining districts will elect representatives hostile to minority
interests. If the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis were true, it would
provide a reason for proponents of minority rights to oppose the creation of majority-black districts. Such districts might do nothing more
than produce token representatives who would be doomed to lose
3
again and again in unsympathetic assemblies.
Professor Karlan demonstrates that the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis holds only when multiple conditions are met. Some of
these conditions describe the nature of black political interests: Black
political interests must differ from white political interests (otherwise
there would be no need to worry that black representatives would
become persistent losers in unsympathetic legislatures), but they
must not differ too radically (otherwise black voters could never form
coalitions with white voters). 4 Other conditions apply to white political behavior: If whites resent black political power, then white voters
may realign to oppose black interests whenever black voters acquire
sufficient clout to influence an election.5 Professor Karlan concludes
that the truth of the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis depends on the
ability of black voters to reinforce the power of the Democratic political party. 6 "[V]irtual, party-based representation is the key to any

2.
Professor Karlan devotes special attention to Professor Abigail Thernstrom's articulation of the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis. See id. at 298-99 (citing Abigail Thernstrom, More
Notes from a PoliticalThicket, 44 Emory L. J. 911 (1995); Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes
Count?: Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights (Harvard U., 1987)).
Professor Karlan, of course, does not call the argument "the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis"; she calls it "the bleaching hypothesis." See, for example, id. at 293. This seems to
me a bit of rhetorical gamesmanship; after all, nobody wants to be a "bleaching theorist." In any
event, "bleaching" misdescribes the essence of the hypothesis. "Bleaching" refers to the claim
that the creation of majority-black voting districts increases the homogeneity of white majorities
in other legislative districts; as Karlan notes, this is "a simple mathematical face' about which
she and Professor Thernstrom agree. Id. at 294. The disagreement is not about whether
majority-black districts "bleach" a state's majority-white districts, but rather about whether
such bleaching has an adverse impact in the legislature as a whole. Professor Thernstrom
hypothesizes that it does; Professor Karlan disagrees.
The dispute is about "assembly
backlash," not "bleaching."
3.
Indeed, "packing" minority voters into a small number of districts is a recognized
tactic that has been used to disenfranchise black voters. See, for example, Pamela S. Karlan,
All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 S. Ct. Rev. 245, 249-50
(describing various means used to disadvantage minority voters). The crucial question is
whether well-intentioned efforts to increase the voice of black voters might have the same
deleterious effects as ill-intentioned efforts to decrease their power.
4.
Karlan, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 300 (cited in note 1).
5.
Id. at 312-13. See also id. at 317-18.
6.
Id. at 306-09.
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realistic account of how [the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis] works,"
7
says Professor Karlan.

In light of this conclusion, Professor Karlan urges us to "think
longer and harder" about whether to accept the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis.8 That suggestion is hard to resist: nobody-and least of
all an academic-can object to thinking more about a complex problem. Of course, thinking longer is a neutral proposal; after pondering
the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis, one might either accept it or
reject it. But that does not seem to be quite what Professor Karlan
has in mind. Indeed, she implies that it is chiefly the adherents of the
Assembly Backlash Hypothesis who have more work to do, and that
this is so because they are wrong. She says, for example, that the
Assembly Backlash Hypothesis rests upon "contradictory premises,"9
and that "we should think longer and harder than many frustrated
and disappointed liberals have so far about whether embracing the
universalist aspiration of a colorblind Constitution will be a step
forward, or a step back."1
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MAJORITY-BLACK DISTRICTS

If Professor Karlan limited her fire to constitutional applications of the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis, I would be persuaded by
her claim. The first of my four observations about Professor Karlan's
argument emphasizes this point of agreement: Neither the Assembly
Backlash Hypothesis nor any ideal of colorblindnessjustifies reading
the Constitution to prohibit the creation of majority-black voting districts. For constitutional purposes, it suffices to observe that the
Assembly Backlash Hypothesis depends upon complex sociological
assumptions that might be false; it does not matter whether those
assumptions are in fact false. Reasonable people can disagree about
whether majority-black districts are a good means for promoting
racial equality. Legislators ought therefore to be free to exercise their
own best judgment about whether to create such districts. The great
vice of Shaw v. Reno"1 and its progeny 12 is that those decisions reduce

7.

Id. at 309.
Id. at 322.
9.
Id. at 293.
10. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993) (holding that racial gerrymanders
violate the Equal Protection Clause if they depart too far from traditional districting principles).

8.
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the options available to legislators trying to cope with the most important problem facing the United States, the problem of racial equality.
Of course, the Constitution often, and quite justifiably, limits
legislative discretion in the name of political principle. But the
Assembly Backlash Hypothesis is not a political principle. It is an
empirically contingent strategy for achieving racial equality: The best
way to protect the interests of racial minorities, according to the
Hypothesis, is to facilitate the creation of electoral coalitions between
minority voters and majority voters.
Nor is it possible to rule out majority-black districts on the
basis of some other plausible constitutional principle. One might
believe, for example, that the Constitution contains an absolute prohibition upon racial segregation. 13 Justice O'Connor, in her opinion in
Shaw, seemed to suggest that majority-black districts segregated the
races. She wrote that such districts "bear[] an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." 14 But that is not so; newly minted majority-black districts are often highly integratedpolitical units. 15
Some people believe that the Constitution prohibits all laws
that use racial classifications. Yet even that principle, which I think
implausibly broad,'6 would not render majority-black districts unconstitutional. Such districts are not defined by race. In majority-black
districts, as in other voting districts, voter eligibility depends upon
place of residence. Voters who show up at polling booths need not
identify their race in order to prove that they are entitled to vote in
the district.
In order to condemn majority-black districts, one must reach
for a much broader principle. One would have to claim, for example,
that legislators cannot take race into account when designing legislative districts. Such an expansive claim is implausible. In general,
legislative districts are geographically contiguous regions that reflect

12. The Supreme Court has applied Shaw v. Reno to invalidate race-conscious districting
schemes in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.
Ct. 1894, 135 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1996); and Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996).
13. I have argued that it does. I first endorsed a constitutional anti-segregation principle
in Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
1297, 1318-20 (1994), and elaborated my position in Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 87, 92-93 (1996), and Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v.
Reno, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 515, 515-19 (1996).
14. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
15. See, for example, Kenneth J. Cooper, Voting Rights and Wrongs; Backers of Odd N.C.
District Point to History, Wash. Post Al (July 13, 1993) (pointing out that North Carolina's 12th
Congressional District, which was one of the districts challenged in Shaw, was only 53% black).
16. Eisgruber, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 1319 & n.85 (cited in note 13).

1997]

ASSEMBLY BACKLASH

351

commonalities of interest. One need not indulge in suspicious stereotyping in order to believe that interests will sometimes track racial
lines. For example, racial minorities will sometimes have a special
interest in fighting racial discrimination. A shared interest of this
sort is no more suspect than, say, the special interest that farmers
have in issues of agricultural policy, such as price subsidies for crops.
The point is not that racial minorities or farmers think alike; instead,
the point is that they are united by their shared concerns about an
issue that affects them more than it does most other members of society. 17 It would be odd (and exceedingly unrealistic) to think that legislators may legitimately take into account the shared interests of
farmers, but not the shared interests of racial minorities, when de18
signing legislative districts.
I close this constitutional analysis with two caveats. First, I do
not mean to suggest that racial gerrymanders are unproblematic from
a constitutional standpoint. On the contrary, any gerrymander, racial
or not, undermines important constitutional values. The calculated
design of "safe seats" deprives voters of any real choice, protects stale
policies against fresh challenges, and fosters cynicism about representative government. Moreover, when districts have irregular and
complex boundaries, voters are unlikely to know who else votes with
them in their districts; as a result, their capacity to become involved
in grassroots politics diminishes. I do not know whether the judiciary
has the practical capacity to remedy these problems, 19 but I have no
doubt that they possess a constitutional dimension. It bears repetition, however, that these constitutional difficulties have nothing to do

17. I have made this argument before in Eisgruber, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. at 523-24 (cited in
note 13).
18. Even the conservative justices on the Supreme Court have conceded this point. See
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490 (admitting that an ethnically homogenous legislative district will
sometimes be entirely consistent with traditional, respectable line-drawing practices). See also
Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951 (plurality opinion) ("Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because
redistricting is performed with consciousness of race."). As Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have
pointed out, this inevitable concession undermines the logic of Shaw v. Reno. See Miller, 115 S.
Ct. at 2504-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (collecting evidence that traditional districting principles are sometimes sensitive to race); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. at 1922 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
('Nor do I see how our constitutional tradition can countenance the suggestion that a State may
draw unsightly lines to favor farmers or city dwellers, but not to create districts that benefit the
very group whose history inspired the [Fifteenth] Amendment....").
19. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1220-22 (1978) (arguing that
considerations of institutional competence may make it appropriate to assign responsibility for
enforcement of some constitutional norms to a body other than the Supreme Court).
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with the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis; they apply to all gerryman20
ders, not just those that track racial lines.
Second, I do not wish to deny that racial gerrymanders may set
back the cause of racial equality. I am considerably more skeptical
about the long-term effects of race-conscious districting than is
Professor Karlan. I agree with her, however, that the merits of such
districts depend upon complex and contestable empirical premises.
Those empirical issues make it impossible to defend any judicially
enforceable constitutional rule prohibiting race-conscious districting.
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF ASSEMBLY BACKLASH
Professor Karlan does not, so far as I can tell, wish to limit her
attack to the constitutional implications of the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis. She seems to believe that she has given us reasons to
reject the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis entirely, even if it is offered
only as a basis for legislative policymaking. I do not agree, and that
leads me to the second of my four observations: Professor Karlan
promises to reveal a contradiction within the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis, but she does not deliver one.21 I think that Professor
Karlan's analysis of the empirical presuppositions of the Assembly
Backlash Hypothesis is astute and important. I do not believe, however, that Professor Karlan has established that the Hypothesis is
false, or even that it is less probable than competing hypotheses embraced by proponents of majority-black voting districts.
What Professor Karlan shows is that the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis can hold only if black interests and white interests occupy
a complex, and perhaps delicate, equilibrium. Yet, that equilibrium,
even if complex and delicate, might exist. According to Professor
Karlan, the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis depends upon the claim
that black interests benefit when the Democratic Party, rather than
the Republican Party, holds power in legislative institutions. 22 Would
any sensible observer of American politics think otherwise? Professor
Karlan also argues that the creation of majority-black districts will
20.

Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1991 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's real concern should be

with the more significant harms that flow from legislative decisions that 'serve no purpose other
than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may
occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak
segment of the community.'" (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983)).
21. Karlan, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 293 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis "rests on a series of contradictory premises about voting behavior").
22. Id. at 307-09.
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hurt the Democratic Party only if particular conditions hold.23 Those
conditions might, however, in fact hold,24 and the Republican Party's
aggressive defense of majority-black districts in recent years suggests
that some Republicans, at least, believe the conditions do hold.25
Unless Professor Karlan believes that Republicans have suddenly
become more sympathetic to minority rights or that they are poor
judges of electoral self-interest (and if she believes either of these
things, the general tone of her article ought to be less pessimistic), the
Republicans' behavior is good evidence that the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis is sometimes true.
Of course, the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis will sometimes
be false. Efforts to create legislative assemblies sympathetic to minority interests will sometimes fail. Legislators interested in racial
equality might adopt a districting scheme that reduces the number of
majority-black districts and then watch as Republicans win most of
the seats anyway. But similar contingencies attach to the creation of

23. See, for example, id. at 317-20.
24. I do not think Professor Karlan disagrees. She states, for example, that competing
studies of why the Democratic Party suffered losses in 1994 are all "almost entirely a prisoner of
[their] assumptions"-an assessment that suggests that the underlying question remains open.
Id. at 303-04.
25. At a 1990 meeting of the Southern Republican Leadership Conference, the Republican
National Committee announced its plan to join forces with civil rights groups to bring suits
designed to create majority-black and majority-Hispanic voting districts. Paul Taylor, GOP Will
Aid Civil Rights Groups in Redistricting; Party Sees Additional Minority Legislative Seats
Boosting Republican Fortunes Elsewhere, Wash. Post A6 (Apr. 1, 1990). Republican politicians
said that the party's "interest in carving out new minority districts is to make Republican candidates more competitive in a state's remaining districts by reducing their percentage of minority voters." Id. For related reports, see, for example, John Harwood, Blacks, GOP Join Forces
for Reform, St. Petersburg Times Al (Sept. 2, 1990) (reporting that the Republican National
Committee had offered computer software and data to any civil rights group wishing to design
its own reapportionment plan); Michael Oreskes, PoliticalMemo; Seeking Seats, Republicans
Find Ally in Rights Act, N.Y. Times All (Aug. 20, 1990) (analyzing Republican support for the
creation of majority-black and majority-Hispanic voting districts); Adam Pertman, Nationwide,
the Biggest Battle Is Over Redistricting, Boston Globe A17 (Nov. 5, 1990) (reporting that "civil
rights leaders in Arkansas and Ohio, with the backing of the GOP, are pressing court cases for
more black and Hispanic seats in the US House-while Democratic officials oppose those attempts").
More recent evidence comes from the complex politics of reapportionment in Georgia. In the
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762
(1995), in which the Supreme Court upheld a constitutional challenge to Georgia's majorityblack llth Congressional District, id. at 2485-94, the Democrats in the state legislature were
unable to agree upon a reapportionment plan. One barrier to agreement was the possibility
that black Democrats, seeking to preserve majority-black districts even at the risk of losing
seats for the party, might form a coalition with white Republicans. Kevin Sack, Legislators
Letting Court Remap Georgia, N.Y. Times A14 (Sept. 13, 1995); Steven A. Holmes, For Very
Strange Bedfellows, Try Redistricting, N.Y. Times A16 (July 23, 1995). Legislators eventually
abandoned the efforts to produce a reapportionment plan and permitted a federal court to draw
a plan for the state. Kevin Sack, Court Draws Georgia Map of CongressionalDistricts,N.Y.
Times A22 (Dec. 14, 1995).
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majority-black districts. When the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis
holds, those districts will reduce the legislative clout of minorities.
And even when the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis is false, such districts may do nothing to increase the legislative power of black voters.
If the white majority is strong enough, and if its interests are sufficiently distinct from those of the black minority, minority legislators
will be consistent losers.
Insofar as Professor Karlan hopes that majority-black districts
will not merely increase the number of black politicians but also increase the likelihood that black voters will influence legislative policy,
she and other proponents of majority-black districts must contend
with exactly the same empirical paradoxes and tensions that beset
the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis. Legislators representing majority-black districts will exercise significant power only if they are able
to form coalitions with white legislators, and their ability to do so will
depend upon all the complex considerations about interests and voting behavior described in Professor Karlan's Article.
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITARIANISM

This line of argument leads directly to my third observation,
which describes a self-evident but crucial feature about democratic
decisionmaking: Any minority with well-defined and distinctive interests will be a consistent loser in a majoritarianpolitical process
(unless the majority has some reason to identify with or care about the
minority). That is why it should not be surprising that the Assembly
Backlash Hypothesis can hold only if a set of relatively delicate conditions exist. The Assembly Backlash Hypothesis is a strategy for configuring legislative districts so as to enable a well-defined and distinctive minority to exercise significant influence within a majoritarian
political system. Only in rare circumstances will any such strategy-be it the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis or the creation of
majority-black districts-succeed.
My observation about majoritarianism is no doubt crushingly
obvious-if majorities win, then minorities lose-but it has deep and
often overlooked implications for our understanding of democracy.
Democracy ceases to be an appealing idea if it is reduced to mere
majoritarianism. Majoritarianism is a system wherein 40% of the
people lose 100% of the time. That is not a fair way to run a political
system. For democracy to deserve our esteem, it must mean government by the people-the whole people-not government by a majority
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at the expense of minorities. But democracy so conceived makes
sense only if the American people share enough in common to constitute a single people rather than a host of competing peoples.
More specifically, democratic politics is possible only if at least
one of two conditions holds. The first possibility is that interests
might vary greatly from person to person, so that everybody is in the
majority on some issues. If that were so, everybody would occasionally benefit from majoritarian procedures, and majoritarianism might
be a sensible way to implement democracy. Alternatively, citizens
might take an interest in one another. They might, in other words,
believe that their own well-being depended upon the well-being of
their fellow citizens, including citizens in the minority. If that were
so, members of the minority would enjoy virtual representation
through the concerns of the majority, and majoritarianism might
serve democratic ideals.
Both conditions are put in jeopardy by the existence of enduring, cohesive, and self-conscious political factions. When such factions
exist, interests vary from group to group, rather than from person to
person, and people in one faction are unlikely to identify with those in
competing factions. In the United States, racial divisions-and especially the division between black and white Americans-have always
been the most potent and dangerous source of political division. The
great and enduring challenge of American politics has been to forge a
single people with a common interest out of the many groups present
26
in this country.
This observation brings me to what is, in my view, the most
important and intractable empirical question about majority-black
districts: Are such districts, in the long run, likely to ameliorate or
exacerbate racial divisions? It is possible that the naked use of racial
criteria to draw political districts will highlight racial differences and
encourage people to conceive of political disagreements in racial
terms. If indeed race-conscious districting reinforces racial divisions,
that would be a good reason to oppose it.
On the other hand,
Professor Karlan praises race-conscious districting as a kind of affirmative action measure. She contends that majority-black districts
enhance the possibilities for a unified politics by, for example, nurtur-

26. I have previously pursued these arguments in Eisgruber, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. at 516-19
(cited in note 13).
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ing minority candidates who can later compete successfully to earn
27
the votes of white majorities.
One might reasonably take either side in this empirical de2
8
bate.
One also might believe that race-conscious districting has
little or no impact on the way Americans conceive of their political
interests. If, however, majority-black districting can soften or harden
racial divisions, then those effects will be more important than any
short-term impact upon legislative policy. To the extent that America
is divided into racial factions, the argument over majority-black
districts, whichever side you take, matters only at the margins. Draw
political boundaries as you will; if racial minorities constitute distinct
and cohesive interest groups, they will usually lose in majoritarian
politics.
V. RACIAL EQUALITY AND AMERICAN PoLITIcs
I come finally to my last observation:
To the extent that
Professor Karlan suggests that adherents of the Assembly Backlash
Hypothesis fail to share a sincere commitment to racial equality, her
claims find no support whatsoever in her argument. I put this claim
in the conditional since I am not sure whether Professor Karlan
means to attack the good faith of her rivals. She never says so
directly, and I am reluctant to impute any such accusation to her, but
some of her rhetoric is hard to interpret in any other way. So, for
example, she quotes racist statements from Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson,29 and then maintains that "[t]he lens of
colorblindness loses a bit of its clarity when we see how its very
framer understood its compatibility with white educational, economic,
and political dominance.."30 What does Professor Karlan mean by
these remarks? It barely seems necessary to repeat the familiar
warnings against guilt by association, but I'll do so anyway: The fact

27. Karlan, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 306 (cited in note 1). The issue is mooted in Kevin Sack,
Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts GerrymanderingDispute, N.Y. Times Al (Nov. 23,
1996).
28. For that reason, these speculative long-term effects of race-conscious districting, like
the more immediate effects predicted by the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis, cannot supply the
foundation for any judicially enforceable constitutional limits upon the reapportionment process. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. at 1910 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (I know of no workable
constitutional principle, however, that can discern whether the message conveyed is a distressing endorsement of racial separatism, or an inspiring call to integrate the political process.").
29. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Karlan, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 322 (cited in note 1).
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that Harlan was a racist 31 and that Harlan embraced the ideal of
colorblindness does not mean that colorblindness is a racist ideal, or
that others who adopt colorblindness as an ideal are unfaithful to
racial equality.
Indeed, one might go further. It is, perhaps, a commendable
feature of the colorblindness principle that it is powerful enough and
simple enough to constrain even a racist like Harlan. If Americans
were untainted by racial prejudice, one might urge them to do whatever advanced the cause of racial equality. Yet, if Americans were
untainted by racial prejudice, the Equal Protection Clause would
hardly be necessary. 32 If, on the other hand, many Americans are
racist, as Justice Harlan apparently was and as Professor Karlan
supposes many white Americans to be, 33 then it helps to have bright-

line principles sufficiently rigid and compelling to resist the pull of
prejudice.
I would not make so much of Professor Karlan's reference to
Harlan's racism were it a lone example. But it is not; the example
resonates with larger, rather apocalyptic themes in Professor Karlan's
argument announcing and criticizing "an exhaustion of the national
commitment to economic and racial justice for blacks." 34 The willing-

ness of some liberals to entertain the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis
and to criticize majority-black voting districts is apparently, in
Professor Karlan's view, one piece of this more general regression.
Professor Karlan's portrait of the American political climate is so
bleak that she pauses to reassure us that "no one within a mile of the
political mainstream today argues that the solution [to America's race
problem] is outright black disenfranchisement. 35 Well, thank goodness for that!
America's race problems are serious and America's commitment to racial equality is weaker than it ought to be, but, contrary to
Professor Karlan's suggestions, today's politics is nothing like the
31.

This is not the place to parse the strengths and weaknesses of Justice Harlan's vision

of American citizenship, which was in many respects both remarkable and inspiring. See T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom,
Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 961, 964-65 (1992) (discussing Justice Harlan's
views); Eisgruber, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 1314-16 & n.72, 1319 n.83 (cited in note 13) (discussing
Justice Harlan's views and responding to Professor Aleinikoff).
32. Compare Federalist No. 51 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The FederalistPapers
320, 322 (Mentor, 1961) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary.").
33. See, for example, Karlan, 50 Vand. L. Rev. at 314 (cited in note 1) (suggesting that
white voters left the Democratic Party because it became identified with black interests).
34. Id. at 292. See also id. at 321-22 (comparing opponents of majority-black districts to
the progressives who betrayed Reconstruction).
35. Id. at 321.
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racist reaction that choked off Reconstruction. 36 President Clinton in
his first term appointed more racial minorities to political office than
did any other President.3 7 Far from obstructing black enfranchisement, the Clinton Administration lobbied for and secured passage of
the Motor Voter Law, which requires states to permit citizens to
register to vote when they apply for a driver's licenses.38 This
President, whose commitment to racial equality is real if imperfect,
was re-elected by a substantial margin (though he might have lost if
Colin Powell, an African American, had run against him). Shortly
after Clinton's election, the New York Times reported statistics suggesting that during the 1990s the quality of life for African Americans
39
had improved in encouraging and sometimes unprecedented ways.
The New York Times report, however, is hardly reason for
unbridled celebration. One of the improvements reported, for example, was a decline in the percentage of black babies born out of wedlock: it dropped from just over 70% to slightly more than 69%.40 Both
numbers are shockingly high. They put the debate about majorityblack voting districts in perspective; unfortunately, it is hard to believe that the creation or elimination of such districts will have much
effect on a problem with such deep sociological roots. At a minimum,
though, these numbers reinforce Professor Karlan's suggestion that
we must think more intensively and more creatively about how to
achieve racial equality in the United States.
That effort must, of course, include a critical reassessment of
conventional liberal wisdom. The Assembly Backlash Hypothesis,
which questions the value of majority-black districts, is an effort in
that direction. Professor Karlan's useful analysis points out why the
Hypothesis might be false, but also leaves open the possibility that it
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might be true. We do the cause of equality no credit if we doubt that
adherents of the Hypothesis share an appropriate commitment to that
ideal.

VI. CONCLUSION

In one respect, majority-black districts are a sure bet: they are
certain to increase the number of black legislators even if they do not
produce legislative assemblies sympathetic to black interests. This
benefit is nothing to sneeze at. Black politicians may become
powerful national leaders and, even if they do not, can help to articulate interests and needs which might otherwise go unnoticed. The
Assembly Backlash Hypothesis thus asks black Americans to gamble.
They give up a sure thing-more black legislators-for a chance at
something that may be nearly impossible to achieve: legislative assemblies more sympathetic to black interests.
This could be a rotten gamble. Neoliberal critics of race-conscious policies, including affirmative action and the creation of majority-black voting districts, maintain that, in the long run, colorblindness will lead to a more egalitarian ethic in American society by
minimizing the importance of color. These projections are quite
speculative, and they might be dead wrong. As has been noted, it is
possible that race-conscious efforts to nurture black politicians will be
the most successful means to overcome racial polarization in
American politics.
So the colorblindness gamble asks blacks to give up sure gains
(more black people in elite positions) plus speculative future improvements in exchange for nothing but speculative future improvements. In light of the way American history has treated blacks, it is
not surprising that most black leaders greet this gamble skeptically.
And in light of the fact that some who favor the gamble are conservative Republicans with a poor track record on civil rights, some people
will inevitably worry that the gamble is a swindle.
These considerations help to explain the polarized character of
political debate about colorblindness. They also account, I suspect, for
some of the heat in Professor Karlan's rhetoric. Yet, the fact that the
benefits of colorblindness are speculative does not foreclose the possibility that they not only exist but also are weighty enough to justify
abandoning the concrete benefits of race-conscious policies. In other
words, neoliberal critics of race-consciousness might be right. More
specifically, majority-black districts may do more harm than good.
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In the face of terrible and entrenched inequality, we inevitably
confront unpleasant choices. We must pay attention to the long-term
consequences of policies, and we must be willing to think openly and
honestly about those consequences. Professor Karlan's detailed and
rigorous analysis of the Assembly Backlash Hypothesis is an important contribution to that enterprise. It leaves us, however, with as
many questions as it answers. In this area, as in much of politics, we
may have to select among cloudy options on the basis of highly contestable judgments about human nature and inferences from history.

